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THOMAS V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Co.:
SEMANTICS, FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND AN OUTDATED
DISTINCTION
INTRODUCTION
In times of market volatility, financial crises, and increasingly un-
certain economic prospects, it is vital that individuals and families make
the right personal investment decisions. As the costs of basic needs such
as education and healthcare have increased, many financial responsibili-
ties have shifted from government and employers to individuals.' Conse-
quently, individual investors must now manage a dizzying array of com-
plex investment and insurance options.2 Although a large body of regula-
tion prevents the world of retail finance from approaching anything like a
Hobbesian state of nature,3 investing is not for the faint of heart. Termi-
nology can be arcane and confusing. Brokers and advisers who appear
to offer the same services may have vastly different fee and compensa-
tion structures, and may be held to vastly different standards of care.
These distinctions are neither obvious nor meaningful to the average
retail investor seeking to insure his or her family against disaster, invest
for retirement, or prepare for the costs of a child's higher education.6
1. See METLIFE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: AGAINST THE BACKDROP
OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN SHIFT 1 (2007), available at, http://www.hirmemphis.com/
PDF/2007%2OData/MetLifeAmericanDreamStudyFinal012507.pdf; see also Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1275
(2011). Two of the most significant trends are the replacement of defined benefit plans with defined
contribution plans and declines in quality and subsidization of employer-sponsored health insurance.
These trends may not be entirely unwelcome to MetLife and its brethren.
2. See METLIFE, supra note 1, at 1; see also Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1276.
3. Chapter 13, titled "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, As Concerning Their Felicity,
and Misery," describes the "nasty, brutish, and short" lives of men living without government or
law. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82, 84 (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1651).
4. See, e.g., Glossary of Investment Terms, RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL,
http://www.raymondjames.com/gloss.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) ("Keeping up with the increas-
ing number of investment products and services . .. can be confusing."); News Release, ING Direct,
ING DIRECT USA's ShareBuilder Launches New "Touch The Ball" TV Campaign That Turns
Online Investing Perception Upside Down (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
htp://multivu.pmewswire.com/mnr/sharebuilder/48620/ ("When it comes to investing, technical
jargon, confusing trading tools and a blizzard of data can leave many investors feeling over-
whelmed.").
5. See, e.g., ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTOR AND
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 89-90, 109 (2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-lrandiabdrepon.pdf; STAFF OF U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS, at i, 95, 98-100 (2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY],
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
6. See Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for
an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203,
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Much of the regulation of financial services arose in the 1930s and
1940s, when investment services were more bifurcated: brokers7 execut-
ed securities transactions for customers in return for a commission, while
investment advisers dispensed advice and managed customer accounts in
return for a fee that was typically a percentage of assets under manage-
ment.8 As a result, brokers are regulated by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act)9, while investment advisers are regulated by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA)'o. Further complicating matters,
some broker activities are regulated by both acts, while others are ex-
empted from the IAA.
In Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," the Tenth Circuit
held that the broker exemption of the IAA applied to the activities of a
Metropolitan Life (MetLife) representative. 12 Although the court's analy-
sis was couched as an exercise in statutory interpretation, its plain lan-
guage analysis of the statute was flawed and created an overly-broad
exemption that will result in the improper exclusion of broker activities
from the requirements of the IAA.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on Met-
Life, the insurance industry and its products, and the regulatory struc-
tures governing brokers and investment advisers. Part II summarizes the
facts, holdings, and procedural history of Thomas. Part III analyzes the
decision in Thomas and focuses on the court's analysis of the IAA's bro-
ker exemption, concluding that the court's interpretation of the phrase
"solely incidental" was flawed, unduly broadening the broker exemption
and leading to less investor protection. This Comment concludes that the
court should have adopted a narrower interpretation of the exemption,
proposes such an interpretation, and finally notes that in light of recent
developments in the regulatory framework, the negative effects of the
Thomas decision may be short-lived.
216 (2011) (citing HUNG ET AL., supra note 5) ("[M]ost investors do not understand general distinc-
tions between broker-dealers and investment advisers . . . .").
7. For simplicity and concision, this Comment uses the term "broker" rather than "broker-
dealer" throughout. In addition, the term may refer to an individual licensed broker or the brokerage
firm for which he or she works.
8. See Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-012 I-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *7 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2007)), affd,
631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011). The crucial distinction with respect to compensation is that the
broker-dealer is compensated per transaction, while the investment adviser is compensated via a fee
schedule.
9. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2006).
10. See generally investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21(2006).
I1. 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 1166-68.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. MetLife and Insurance Products
MetLife exemplifies the late twentieth-century ideal of a "financial
supermarket,"13  a horizontally-integrated 4 behemoth offering a full
range of financial services and products.'5 Like most such entities, Met-
Life relies on a holding company structure. Subsidiaries include Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, Inc., which underwrites various types
of insurance, and MetLife Securities, Inc., a registered broker and adviser
that sells both investment products and advisory services.' 6
MetLife employs financial services representatives (FSRs) to sell its
products and services to the general public.' 7 FSR compensation is com-
mission-based and representatives are incentivized to push proprietary
MetLife products.' 8 These products include not only traditional insurance
policies, but also securities, mutual funds, variable universal life insur-
ance policies (VULPs), and annuities.19 In addition, MetLife Securities
also employs financial planners who offer fee-based planning and advi-
sory services. 20
A VULP allows policy-holders to buy insurance and invest the cash
value of the policy in securities. 21 Return on these investments is not
immediately subject to taxation, providing customers with tax-deferred
13. A financial supermarket is "[a] company offering a wide range of financial services (e.g.
stock, insurance and real-estate brokerage)." Financial Supermarket, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialsupermarket.asp (last visited on Oct. 20, 2011).
14. Horizontal integration refers to the process by which "a company expands its business
into different products that are similar to current lines." Horizontal Integration, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalintegration.asp (last visited on Oct. 20, 2011).
15. See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Retail Delivery of Financial Services After the Gramm-Leach
Bliley-Act: How Will Public Policy Shape the "Financial Services Supermarket"?, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 39, 40 (2000) (defining "financial services supermarket" in the context of Gramm-Leach
Bliley); Contact MetLife, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/about/corporate-
profile/contact/metlife/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (demonstrating corporate structure).
16. See MetLife Securities, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/about/corporate-
profile/contact/metlife-securities/index.htmI (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). MetLife is also an umbrella
for a number of other subsidiaries not directly relevant to this case, including MetLife Bank, N.A.
and a number of specialized insurance-related companies.
17. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157; New Financial Services Representatives, METLIFE,
http://www.metlife.com/careers/sales-jobs/new-financial-representatives/index.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2011).
18. The incentives include both carrots and sticks: FSRs are compensated for selling proprie-
tary products as well as subject to termination for not meeting quotas of such products. Thomas, 631
F.3d at 1157, 1167.
19. See, e.g., Insurance, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/insurance/index.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011); Investment Products, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/
investment-products/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
20. See Financial Planning, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/planning/financia/
index.html#overview (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
21. See Hugh D. Berkson, Variable Universal Life Policies: Can They Be Sold Without Mis-
leading the Customer?, 1686 PRAC. L. INST. 421, 424 (2008); Bruce W. Fraser, VUL: Pros and
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growth. Policy-holders, however, also assume substantial investment
risk, are subject to limited investment choices, and incur expenses that
may not be obvious.22 The marketing of VULPs has been criticized for
featuring unrealistic rates of return and burying fees and costs in fine
print.23 An average investor may have difficulty understanding the dif-
ferences between, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of, various
life insurance options, including VULPs.24 Significantly, because the
purchaser bears investment risk with a VULP, the product is regulated as
a security, and can only be sold by a registered broker.25
B. Regulation of the Securities Industry
In response to the loss of public faith in capital markets that arose
from the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression,
Congress enacted a series of federal securities laws.26 The Securities Act
of 1933 regulated the primary distribution of shares; the Exchange Act,
enacted in 1934, created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission) and regulated the secondary markets, including the ac-
tivities of brokers; and the IAA, enacted in 1940, established rules for the
regulation of investment advisers.2 7
Brokers are required to be members of a self-regulatory organiza-
tion.28 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) performs
this task.29 FINRA and its predecessors developed rules that require in-
vestments recommended by a broker to be "suitable" for a customer. 30
Under this standard, a broker must have reasonable grounds for believing
a recommendation is suitable for a customer based on that customer's
financial situation.31 Notably, this standard does not require a broker to
disclose any conflicts of interest.3 2
In contrast, the IAA does not delegate regulation to SROs; instead,
regulatory oversight remains with the SEC. Investment advisers (who
22. See Fraser, supra note 21.
23. See Berkson, supra note 21, at 423. The hypothetical sale of a VULP by a fast-talking
insurance agent in the introduction of Berkson's article illustrates both the optimistic bias of a typi-
cal sales pitch and the possible negative consequences of a market downturn to a policy-holder.
24. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Robert S. Stillman, The Law and Economics of Vanishing
Premium Life Insurance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1997) ("Even financially sophisticated consumers
may lack a detailed understanding of the different types of insurance products.").
25. Berkson, supra note 21, at 425-26 .
26. See Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advis-
ers, 65 Bus. LAW. 395, 402 (2010).
27. Id.
28. This requirement was put in place in 1983. See SECO Programs, Exchange Act Release
No. 20409, 29 SEC Docket 275 (Nov. 22, 1983).
29. Varnavides, supra note 6, at 205.
30. See id. at 206.
31. Id. The broker must take into account customer's financial status, tax status, and objec-
tives when analyzing suitability.
32. See id. at 206-07. For examples of such conflicts, see infra text accompanying note 128.
33. Varnavides, supra note 6, at 209-10.
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are compensated for providing advice about buying or selling securities)
are held by the IAA to a fiduciary standard, which requires that an agent
observe the duties of loyalty and care in its dealings with a principal.3 4
This is a much higher standard than mere suitability; the duty of loyalty,
in particular, requires an adviser to "subordinate [his] interests to those of
the principal."3  Both Congress and courts have recognized that undis-
closed conflicts of interest are antithetical to this duty.36
While brokers providing investment advice fall under the general
statutory definition of investment adviser, they are exempted from regu-
lation under the IAA if the advice they give is "solely incidental to" their
broker activities and they receive "no special compensation" for the ad-
vice. The exempt brokers are thus held to the lower suitability standard
established by FINRA under the Exchange Act, not the fiduciary stand-
ard under the IAA.
Many commentators have noted that the traditional differences be-
tween brokers and investment advisers have diminished, with both
providing nearly identical services to retail customers.38 The SEC, not
unaware of these concerns, in 2008 commissioned the RAND Institute to
review the current state of the investment business, including the regula-
tory framework, broker and advisor business practices, and investors'
understanding of the business.3 9 The ensuing report indicated, among
other things, that retail investors made little distinction between brokers
and advisers.40
Also recognizing the overlapping roles of these entities were the
drafters of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).4 1 Section 913 of Dodd-Frank gave the SEC
authority to make rules establishing a uniform fiduciary standard for bro-
34. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-
Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 50-51, 64-67 (2011).
35. See Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1285 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.01 cmt. b (2006)). As a simple example of the difference in practice, consider a broker who sells
two investment products, SI and S2, that have similar risk and return characteristics. S2 is more
expensive than SI, and the broker receives a higher commission or other financial incentive for
selling S2. Under the suitability standard, as long as S2 is considered suitable for a customer, the
broker may advise that customer to purchase S2. Under the fiduciary standard, the broker may not
advise the customer to purchase S2, because the customer's interests are best served by purchasing
Sl.
36. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) ("The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at
least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline a[n] investment adviser-consciously or
unconsciously-to render advice which was not disinterested." (quoting Louts LOSS, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961))).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2006).
38. See, e.g., Vamavides, supra note 6, at 215 (referencing a speech by SEC commissioner
Elisse B. Walter).
39. See id. at 216.
40. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 112-13.
41. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 48.
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kers and advisers. 4 2 Dodd-Frank also mandated that the SEC produce a
study of the regulation of advisers and brokers; the ensuing report rec-
ommended "a fiduciary standard no less stringent than currently applied
to investment advisers" under the IAA.43 At the time of this writing,
however, the SEC had not engaged in any rulemaking based on this rec-
ommendation.
II. THOMAS V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In 2001, Robert and Amanda Thomas met with Jeffrey Laxton, a
MetLife FSR, to discuss their finances." Laxton, following company
procedures for new clients, conducted a suitability analysis, advised the
Thomases on asset allocation for their retirement fund (which was not
managed by MetLife), and recommended several proprietary MetLife
investment products.45 At that time, the Thomases did not purchase any
products or pay a fee for investment advice.46
In 2003, the Thomases met with Laxton following the birth of their
child.47 Laxton, again following company procedures, reviewed the
Thomases' then-current financial situation and his 2001 analysis. Based
on this review, he recommended a proprietary MetLife VULP to serve as
a savings vehicle for the child's college education.4 8 The Thomases fol-
lowed Laxton's advice, both by purchasing the VULP and by allocating
assets as he recommended. MetLife reserved 2.25% of the VULP's
$91.00 monthly premium for the compensation of FSRs such as
Laxton.49
In 2007, Mr. Thomas brought an individual and putative class-
action complaint against MetLife in federal district court alleging various
claims under state law, the Exchange Act, and the IAA.50 The trial court
dismissed the state law and securities claims and granted summary
judgment for MetLife on the IAA claim.5' The Thomases appealed on
two grounds: (1) that the district court's refusal to allow them to amend
their second amended complaint to add named plaintiffs with standing to
42. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1824-27 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
43. See SEC STUDY, supra note 5, at v-vi. Two commissioners effectively dissented from the
study. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.




48. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), affd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
49. See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157.
50. Id. at 1156, 1158.
51. Id. at 1157-58.
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bring securities claims was an abuse of discretion; and (2) that the district
court's grant of summary judgment on the IAA claim was in error.5 2
B. Holding
1. Abuse of Discretion
The Tenth Circuit first considered the Thomases' appeal of the dis-
trict court's ruling on the motion for leave to amend. 3 Although neither
party had raised the issue of standing, the court considered it sua sponte
and held that the Thomases lacked standing to appeal the ruling.54
At trial, the Thomases sought to add plaintiffs who had purchased
securities from MetLife (and thus had standing for a federal securities
claim) to their second amended complaint, a request that the district court
denied.5 5 Relying upon precedent, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that, be-
cause the Thomases lacked standing to bring securities claims them-
selves, they were not aggrieved by the district court's refusal to allow
them to add third parties (who did have such standing) to their com-
plaint.56 In addition, the court held that the fact that the suit was a puta-
tive class action was irrelevant because no class had been certified, and
the Thomases were the only appellants before the court on appeal.
2. Summary Judgment
The bulk of the Tenth Circuit's opinion was spent reviewing the
summary judgment order on the IAA claims.58 The court began by noting
that, for an appeal of summary judgment, (1) the standard of review was
de novo, (2) the evidence would be viewed in the light most favorable to
the Thomases, and (3) the judgment was appropriate when there was no
genuine dispute of material fact and the appellee was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. 5 9 The matter of law at issue, according to the
court, was the IAA's definition of "investment adviser." 60
The court's first task was one of statutory interpretation. It noted
that the IAA "[g]enerally . . . imposes fiduciary duties on 'investment
advisers,'" 6 defined as persons who "advis[e] others ... as to ... invest-
52. Id.at1156-57.
53. See id. at 1158-60.
54. See id. ("[W]e have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction." (quoting
Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
55. See id. at 1158-59.
56. See id. at 1159 (citing Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co., 150 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th
Cir. 1998)) ("[P]arties generally do not have standing to appeal . . . to protect the rights of third
parties.").
57. See id.
58. See id. at I160-68.
59. See id. at 1160.
60. See id.
61. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006)).
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ing in, purchasing, or selling securities" 62 for compensation. But, the
court continued, the IAA explicitly exempted from this definition brokers
or dealers whose performance of advisory services was "solely incidental
to" the conduct of their business and who did not receive "special com-
63
pensation" for those services.
a. "Solely Incidental to"
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation of
the phrase "solely incidental to" as simply indicating a relationship be-
tween investment advice and sale of a security rather than the importance
of that advice relative to the sale. 4
After first noting that the IAA did not define the phrase, the court
turned to the dictionary. 65 Based on its reading of multiple definitions in
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary, the court declared
that a secondary object was "incidental" to a primary object when (1) the
secondary object occurred only in relation to the primary object; and (2)
the secondary object was of lesser size or importance than the primary
object.66 Although the definition was conjunctive, the court rejected the
second prong, noting that an inquiry into relative size would create an
uncertain test and be an exercise in "line-drawing." 67 Further, the adjec-
tive "solely" could not meaningfully modify the word "incidental" if the
definition of the latter included such a relative-size component.6 ' Thus,
the phrase "solely incidental to" meant "only. . . in connection with." 69
The Tenth Circuit then turned to various SEC releases70 related to
the IAA.n It began by noting that it would defer to a rule or regulation
interpreting the IAA, but none had been supplied, leaving only the per-
62. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2006)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
63. Id. (quoting § 80b-2(a)(11)(C)).
64. See id. at 1161 (quoting Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL
2778663, at *6-7 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), af'd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. See id at 1162. In fact, the court consulted several dictionaries, including two different
editions of Black's Law Dictionary. See id. at 1162 n.2.
66. See id at 1162 & n.2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (9th ed. 2009); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 942-43 (3d ed. 1933); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1257 (2d
ed. 1956); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 966 (2d ed. 2001)).
67. Seeid.atll62.
68. See id The trial court's reasoning on this issue was slightly different; the court apparently
assumed that the definition of "incidental" could be either "attendant to" (MetLife's argument) or "a
minor ... or . . . insignificant part of' (Thomases' argument) and concluded that "[t]he modifier
'solely' does not fit well with" the latter definition. See Thomas, 2009 WL 2778663, at *4.
69. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162.
70. As part of its rulemaking process, the SEC typically produces three types of informational
releases: concept releases, rule proposals, and rule adoption. See The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter The Investor's Advocate].
71. See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162-63.
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suasive positions of the SEC's releases on the subject.72 The court high-
lighted three such releases. First, a 1946 release stated that brokers typ-
ically provided "a certain amount of advice to" customers, and that
amount was not sufficient to regulate them under the IAA.7 Second,
releases from 2005 and 2007 indicated that advice was "solely incidental
to" a broker's business when the former was "in connection with and
reasonably related to" the latter. The court concluded that the SEC's
position in these releases was that "solely incidental to" was a question
of mere connection, not relative importance.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the legislative history of the IAA.77
The court noted that Congress passed the IAA to regulate a class of pro-
fessionals that purported to provide, for a fee, unbiased investment ad-
vice as a "distinct product."78 Because brokers were already regulated
under the Exchange Act, they were not the target of the legislative pro-
posals that eventually became the IAA (notwithstanding any advice they
might provide as part of their business). 79 The court concluded that this
historical distinction between brokers and advisers supported its interpre-
tation that the key inquiry was whether a broker was acting in an adviso-
ry capacity connected to the traditional broker activity of buying or sell-
ing securities, not the relative importance of the activities.80
b. "Special Compensation"
The court analyzed the second prong of the exemption, "special
compensation," using a similar framework: plain-language, SEC releas-
es, and legislative history.81 The Thomases had maintained that the
phrase referred to any economic benefit received by a broker from a
transaction that involved investment advice. 82 The Tenth Circuit, howev-
er, concluded that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
statutory language because it would obviate the need for the word "spe-
cial," which, in turn, would render the entire prong superfluous.
Like "solely incidental to," "special compensation" was not defined
in the IAA.84 Rather than consulting a dictionary, the court instead
looked at the statutory context.85 First, the court determined that "com-
72. Id.





78. Id at 1163-64.
79. See id.
80. Seeid.atil64.
81. See id. at l 64-65.
82. Id at 1166.
83. Id.
84. Id.atll62,1164.
85. See id. at 1164.
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pensation" must refer to an economic benefit received because of adviso-
ry services.86 Second, the court highlighted that the word "special" nec-
essarily modified "compensation" in a way that distinguished it from
both the general "compensation" referred to in the statutory definition of
"Investment Adviser" and the normal transaction-based compensation
(i.e., commission) given to brokers for buying and selling securities. 8 7
Thus, based on the statutory language, "special compensation" was (1)
compensation other than a commission or commission analog; that was
(2) specifically received for investment advice. 8
The court then examined SEC releases related to the IAA's broker
exemption.89 A 1978 release referred to charges "specifically" and
"clearly definable . . . for investment advice."90 A 1989 action letter dis-
tinguished "a commission, mark-up, mark-down or similar fee for bro-
kerage services" from "special compensation." 91 The court concluded
that these positional statements from the SEC were consistent with its
interpretation of the phrase.9 2
Finally, the court examined the IAA's legislative history.93 Again,
the court noted that Congress passed the IAA not in reaction to the be-
havior of brokers, who were regulated by the Exchange Act, but to a
growing class of professional investment advisers who were not other-
wise regulated.94 As the legislation made its way through Congress, both
the House and Senate had clearly distinguished brokers who "receive[d]
only brokerage commissions" from those who received compensation
specifically for advisory services. 5 Thus, the historical context supported
the court's interpretation of "special compensation" as something more
96
than a brokerage commission.
c. Application
Having interpreted the statutory language, the court turned to the
facts of the case.97 That Laxton's primary business was as a broker of
financial products, and that he had provided advice to the Thomases in
order to sell them a financial product, was not disputed. 9 8 The advice was
a secondary action in support of Laxton's primary action and objective:
86. Id.







94. See id.at 1166.
95. Id. at 1165.
96. Id. at 1166.
97. Id. at 1166-67.
98. See id.
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selling the policy. 99 Thus, under the court's interpretation, Laxton's ad-
vice was "solely incidental to" his sale of securities; the relative amounts
of advice and sales in the transaction were irrelevant.' 00
Laxton's compensation was tied to the sale of the policy; he re-
ceived a "production credit" of $500 from MetLife after selling the poli-
cy and did not receive any compensation specifically tied to advice.' 0'
Further, his quotas were based on selling investment products, not ad-
vice.102 This compensation did not meet either of the "special compensa-
tion" prongs established by the court: it was not received specifically in
exchange for advice, and it was not distinct from a commission. 0 3 Thus,
under the court's interpretation, Laxton's compensation was not "special
compensation." Because Laxton's activities met both the "solely inci-
dental" and "special compensation" prongs of the IAA's broker exemp-
tion, they were not regulated under the IAA.'0
III. ANALYSIS
Thomas was a case of first impression in the federal circuit courts
and thus has the potential to be quite influential; the Tenth Circuit's in-
terpretation has already been cited in cases in the Ninth and First Cir-
cuits. 05 The court chose to establish a narrow interpretation of "solely
incidental" that led to a broad broker-dealer exemption from the IAA,
but the foundations of this interpretation were tenuous, and the policy
implications mixed. The holding, if widely followed in other circuits,
could diminish protection of retail investors, at least until the SEC fulfills
its Dodd-Frank mandate to harmonize the regulation of brokers and ad-
visers.
A. A Close Call
At first glance, the Thomas decision seems relatively straightfor-
ward: a simple, almost textbook exercise in statutory interpretation. But
upon closer examination, the court's interpretations were not as clear-cut
as they appeared. Specifically, the court's plain language analysis of the
phrase "solely incidental" was logically suspect.
99. See id.





105. See Wiener v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., No. 10-10515-DPW, 2011 WL 1233131, at
*10 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2011) (holding that an investment fund's l2b-1 fees were not "special com-
pensation" for investment advice under the broker-dealer exception of the IAA); Bronzich v. Persels
& Associates, No. CV-10-0364-EFS, 2011 WL 2119372, at *6 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (apply-
ing the Tenth Circuit's plain language interpretation of "solely incidental" to a similar phrase in the
Washington Debt Adjusting Act).
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The strongest section of the Tenth Circuit's analysis was its inter-
pretation of "special compensation." The Thomases argued that any
compensation given to a broker as part of a transaction that involved
advice was "special compensation."' 06 In rejecting the Thomases' inter-
pretation, the court focused on the fact that it would eliminate any dis-
tinction between "special compensation" and "compensation," rendering
the former superfluous. 0 7 The court was, predictably, unwilling to attrib-
ute that intention to Congress.
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the phrase "solely incidental to"
meant "in relation to," and thus had no comparative aspect, was less ob-
vious. The court began by explicitly providing a conjunctive definition of
an "incidental" object: one that occurs only in relation to a primary ob-
ject and is comparatively smaller in size or importance.108 The court then
noted that the Thomases' interpretation of "incidental" focused on the
comparative component "without regard" to the relational.1 09 This was
not strictly true: the Thomases claimed that Laxton's advice was not
solely incidental to his brokerage activities because it was a "central
component" of his sales of MetLife products.o10 Thus, the Thomases'
interpretation implicitly encompassed both the relational and compara-
tive aspects, and comported with the definition the court had just estab-
lished."'
Immediately after remonstrating the Thomases for their lack of re-
gard to one part of the definition of "solely incidental," the court com-
mitted the very same sin.1 12 Noting that the word "solely" meant "exclu-
sively or only" and, in the statutory exemption, "compl[e]ment[ed] the
relational aspect of 'incidental,"' the court leapt to the conclusion that
"solely" could not meaningfully modify the comparative aspect of the
definition." Because it was unwilling to adopt an interpretation that
would render the word "solely" superfluous, the court declared that the
plain-language definition it had just taken pains to establish was inappli-
cable and the district court's definition-which only included the rela-
tional component-was correct.l14
106. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1166. The Thomases' reasoning appeared to be that if a broker
performed two activities, A and B, as part of a compensated transaction, then some part of the com-
pensation must have been for each activity. It is not clear, however, why this would have to be the
case.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1162 ("[A]ll definitions establish that the word 'incidental' has two components.
To be considered incidental, two ... objects must be related ... [and] ... the incidental ... object . .
must be secondary in size . . .
109. Seeid.at1162.
110. Id.atll61.
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There are several possible responses to this argument. First, the
word "solely" is not better suited to modify "occurring in relation to"
than it is to modify "secondary to." The mere fact that the word modifies
each aspect differently does not imply that it is better suited to modify
one or the other: the salient point is that it can meaningfully modify
both." 5 Furthermore, when "solely" limits "occurring in relation to," the
result is absurd: the statute exempts a broker only if her advice was relat-
ed to the sale of securities and not related to anything else. This makes
little sense, as the advice given would presumably stem from, and be
related to, any number of other things (e.g., macroeconomic conditions
and the broker's analysis of the client's financial situation). Perversely,
such a reading specifically exempts any broker whose advice is related
only to his desire to sell a specific security, and is thus entirely self-
serving.
Even if one accepts the court's assertion that "solely" can only
meaningfully modify the relational aspect of the definition, this does not
imply rejection of the comparative. The modifier is not superfluous if it
can meaningfully modify at least one element of the definition; one
might deconstruct the phrase "A is solely incidental to B" as "A is only
related to B, and A is a small part of B." This maintains both elements of
the definition and still allows the modifier to inform its meaning.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit's plain language analysis, established a
two-part definition of "incidental," wrongly criticized the Thomases for
disregarding one part, and then discarded the other part based on ques-
tionable parsing of the surrounding language. The Tenth Circuit also
failed to mention how close a call the district court had considered the
issue. In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's conjunctive, two-part definition
of "incidental," the district court had considered the relational and com-
parative aspects of "incidental" as separate, mutually exclusive defini-
tions; in deciding to adopt the relational aspect, it stated "[a]t the risk of
parsing the statutory language too closely, . . . analysis of the language of
the legislation cuts in favor of MetLife, but not compellingly so." 6 Any
such doubt was lacking in the Tenth Circuit's holding.
Leaving aside the logical and linguistic gymnastics,1 7 the court
found somewhat better support for its position by examining SEC com-
ments and legislative history. But even these persuasive sources were
less than overwhelming in their support for the court's position. The
court cited a 1946 SEC Release for its recognition that the fact that bro-
115. To say that A only occurs in relation to B provides no particular information about the
relation itself, but merely serves a limiting function: "A occurs in relation to B, and not in relation to
anything else." In contrast, when modifying "secondary to," it serves an emphasizing function: "A is
secondary to B, and no greater."
116. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), aff'd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
I 17. Perhaps "contortionism" would be more apt.
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kers "commonly give a certain amount of advice" would not "bring them
within the scope of the [IAA].""' But the phrase "a certain amount of
advice" fits with the comparative component of "incidental" discussed
above, with the phrase "a certain amount" indicating a small amount of
advice relative to the broker's primary business." 9
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the SEC has consistently interpreted
the broker-dealer exception, but this conclusion is less than clear. The
court cited a 2005 SEC Release that interpreted "solely incidental to" as
"in connection with and reasonably related to"; however, the same doc-
ument contained a provision stating that advice is not solely incidental if
it is in connection with financial planning.120 The 2005 interpretation was
struck down in a 2007 case,121 after which the SEC came back with yet
another proposed interpretation, this time dropping the financial planning
2 1 23
provision.12 The purported interpretive consistency remains elusive.
The combination of ambiguities in the plain language and inconsist-
encies in the SEC guidance might argue for a conservative approach that
embodies all reasonable facets of the term's meaning, which would ef-
fectively err on the side of investor protection. But perhaps the key to the
court's interpretation lies in this declaration, buried in the middle of the
plain-language analysis: "Plaintiffs' proposed reading ... [would create]
a difficult problem of line-drawing-how much advice is too much, and
how could we measure the importance of the advice?" 2 4 This is a valid
point: embracing an interpretation that involved weighing the relative
importance of the advice in a security sales transaction would have re-
quired the court to leave the issue to a more fact-intensive inquiry, and
perhaps establish a set of guidelines or factors. In contrast, eliminating
the need for such an inquiry created a cleaner and more predictable legal
rule. It seems plausible that ultimately the court justified its analysis with
a decision (conscious or not) to elevate the policy goal of certainty and
predictability over a competing policy goal of investor protection.
118. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163.
119. See Certain, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/
american/certain 20 (defining "a certain" as "some, but not very much") (last visited January 29,
2012).
120. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163 (citing Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2340, 70 Fed.Reg. 2716, 2726 (proposed Jan. 14,
2005)). The release was a reproposal ofa rule first proposed in 1999, Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(1 I)-
1; that rule would have extended the broker exclusion to certain brokers even if they did receive
special compensation for advice. See Laby, supra note 26, at 408-12.
121. Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the SEC's
attempt to broaden the exclusion violated both the letter and intent of the IAA).
122. See Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. IA-2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55126, 55127, 55129 (proposed Sep. 28, 2007).
123. Compare Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163 ("Since ... 1946, the SEC's position has been con-
sistent . . . ."), with Varnavides, supra note 6, at 208 ("Over the last decade, the SEC has repeatedly,
and unsuccessfully, tried to provide a clear interpretation of the ... broker-dealer exception."). See
generally Laby, supra note 26, at 408-11 (detailing "The Rise and Fall of Advisers Act Rule
202(A)( 1)-I").
124. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162.
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B. Implications for Brokers: A Broad Exemption
By choosing to create a more predictable legal rule, the court creat-
ed a broad exemption such that, absent any "special compensation" tied
to investment advice, a broker would only be regulated under the IAA if
the advice had no relation to the sale of securities. 125 The perverse result
is that the IAA's fiduciary standard and requirements for disclosure of
conflicts of interest would only be effective in cases where the broker
would be almost certain not to have such conflicts. 126
In practice, then, Thomas provides a near-roadmap for how a bro-
kerage may incentivize its salespeople to push proprietary products with-
out disclosing the incentive to customers. As illustrated by the
Thomases' interactions with Laxton, so long as the product being sold is
suitable and the incentive is tied to its sale, a broker may quietly put his
or her own interests above those of the customer. To be sure, the sales-
person is subject to other rules of conduct related to conflicts of interest,
such as those related to excessive prices, churning, and undisclosed own-
ership of the security being sold, but the holding leaves considerable
room for brokers to put their own interests above those of their custom-
TS127ers.12
C. Implications for Investors: Less Protection
On the other side of the table, Thomas allows more room for bro-
kers to put their own interests first and leave conflicts undisclosed, which
results in less protection for investors. As noted above, most investors
are not aware of the legal distinctions between brokers and advisers, and
even more sophisticated investors are subject to disadvantages stemming
from information asymmetry and cognitive biases. 12 8 To the extent that
investor protection is a social good, the Thomas holding reduces its
availability.
Despite the predictable complaints of paternalism, protection of re-
tail investors is desirable for a number of policy reasons.1 29 From an eco-
nomic standpoint, hidden conflicts prevent investors from properly dis-
counting for those conflicts, creating an inefficient market.1 30 In addition,
125. Under the court's interpretation, it seems that any relationship at all between advice and
security sales would satisfy the "solely incidental to" prong.
126. In such a case, the broker has no incentive, via special compensation or the potential
commission from the sale of a security, to give conflicted advice.
127. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 61-63, for a discussion of regulations that brokers are sub-
ject to. The issue of undisclosed ownership of a security being sold (scalping) is in principle quite
similar to that of an undisclosed compensation incentive, at least from the point of view of the inves-
tor.
128. See Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1279-80.
129. See id. at 1272-83. The author lays out several policy justifications for regulating invest-
ment recommendations, including risk allocation, asymmetries in information and bargaining power,
asymmetries in sophistication, and conflicts of interest.
130. Id. at 1282. The author argues for an explicit recognition of the value of this discount,
advocating a scheme wherein financial services providers are subject to fiduciary duties unless they
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many economists consider the assumption of substantial investment risk
by an unsophisticated individual investor purchasing a product such as a
VULP to be socially costly.13' Finally, the idea that a firm presenting
itself as a loyal, trusted adviser might give-without notice or disclo-
sure-self-serving advice runs counter to expectations of fair play.132
Although wider consumer awareness of this practice arguably al-
lows consumers to discount products accordingly or demand more exten-
sive information from brokers, such awareness also decreases the level of
trust in the marketplace.' 3 3 As District Court Judge Friot noted in his
decision in Thomas: "Where the product being sold is a sophisticated
financial product . . . the need for unbiased advice--or at least for the
disclosure of those things that might tend to skew the salesman's 'ad-
vice'-would seem to be every bit as great as in a conventional advisory
relationship."' 3 4
D. A Proposal for a Narrower Interpretation of the Broker Exemption
In Thomas, the Tenth Circuit, like most courts, framed the conclu-
sions of its statutory analysis as logical inevitabilities; once the terms
were defined, the outcome was more or less predetermined.13 1 Yet the
court did make debatable interpretive choices. Although it arguably
would have had some difficulty stretching the statutory meaning of "spe-
cial compensation" to cover Laxton's commissions, the court could have
defensibly adopted a narrower definition of "solely incidental to."' 3 6
Such a definition might not have changed the ultimate outcome for the
Thomases,'17 but it would have allowed the Tenth Circuit to maintain a
higher level of investor protection.
Alternatively, the court might have adopted a test in which advice
would be solely incidental to the sale of a security if it was not a substan-
tial factor in the customer's decision to buy that specific product from
that broker. Factors would include whether the advice was specifically
offer customers a put option on the product (i.e. the ability to sell it back within a certain period); his
assertion that this would convey significant and useful information "to even the least financially
literate customer" seems debatable. Id. at 1327-35.
131. See id. at 1274-75 (noting a number of possible negative externalities stemming from
widespread assumption of risk by investors).
132. MetLife is well-known for featuring a certain lovable (and presumptively loyal) pet as its
spokes-canine and dirigible-eponym. The company's television advertising segments emphasize
concepts such as protection and guidance. See TV Advertising, METLIFE,
http://www.metlife.comiabout/advertising/consumer/television/index.html (last visited on Feb. 11,
2012).
133. Again, whether average consumers can receive all of this information and engage in such
rational discounting is an open question.
134. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *9 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), afd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
135. See, e.g., Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011).
136. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the "close call" of the court's interpretation of the
phrase).
137. Perhaps the narrower definition would have led to a remand.
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related to the security sold, whether the broker provided information on
competing options, and whether the customer reasonably relied upon the
broker to select the security. Advice merely related to a class of securi-
ties would not be a sufficient factor, nor would a mere suitability analy-
sis.'38 Such a test-or one similar thereto-would still allow brokers to
provide a "certain amount" of unremunerated advice 3 9 and remain ex-
empt from the IAA, but once that advice crossed the line into steering a
customer to a specific product, the exemption would be lost. 140
Such a test would require a deeper inquiry into the nature of the
broker-investor transaction in question and thus place a slightly higher
burden on the courts. In addition, the narrowing of the broker exemption
(at least compared to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation thereof) would
create at least the theoretical possibility of more litigation. Finally, one
can argue that reading such a test into the straightforward (at least on its
face) language of the IAA is overstepping, and the clarification of the
exemption should be left to the legislature.
Any increase in the broker's burden, however, seems relatively
small when weighed against the need to afford investors greater protec-
tion from conflicts of interest. Furthermore, it is somewhat reductive to
argue that interpretations that create the possibility of more litigation are
inherently bad; litigation is simply a mechanism through which the legal
rights defined by such interpretations are protected. Ultimately, the task
of the courts is to interpret the language of the IAA in light of its over-
arching purpose-investor protection-and adopt any reasonable tests or
factors that make sense. The proposed test affords investors protection
from one of the most prevalent conflicts of interest, while maintaining a
reasonable exemption for brokers who are not steering customers to par-
ticular securities for their own benefit. From a practical standpoint, it
leverages the IAA's existing fiduciary standard to bridge the gap until a
legislative or rules-based solution emerges.
E. Dodd-Frank: A New Hope
In fact, Congress may ultimately dictate the solution. Dodd-Frank,
passed in 2010, recognized that the services offered by brokers and ad-
visers have become nearly indistinguishable.14' The legislation delegated
to the SEC the authority to make rules establishing a uniform fiduciary
138. As an example, under this proposal, a broker would be exempt from the IAA when rec-
ommending life insurance, or even VULPs generally, but would not be exempt when recommending
a specific MetLife VULP.
139. This would fulfill at least one of the SEC's early expressions of the exemption's purpose.
See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163.
140. Another way to look at this is that there would be two cases where brokers' advice would
be regulated by the IAA because it is not "solely incidental to" a sale: when they provide advice that
has no relation at all to a sale, and when they provide advice that is a substantial factor in a sale.
141. Cf Varnavides, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting a speech by SEC commissioner Elisse B.
Walter).
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standard for brokers and advisers, but it also required the Commission to
conduct a study on the business and regulation of brokers and advisers
before implementing any rules in the area. 142
On January 21, 2011, the SEC delivered to Congress the mandated
study on advisers and brokers. 14 3 Among its recommendations were "a
fiduciary standard no less stringent than currently applied to investment
advisers" under the IAA, and "[a] uniform standard of conduct [that] will
obligate both investment advisers and broker-dealers to eliminate or
disclose conflicts of interest."'" Although the recommendations them-
selves do not have legal force, the message is clear: advisers and brokers
should be held to the same (fiduciary) standard when providing invest-
ment advice. 145
How soon-or indeed whether-the SEC will embody these rec-
ommendations in new rules, or interpretations of existing rules, is anoth-
er matter. On the same day the SEC Study was delivered to Congress, the
two Republican SEC Commissioners released a statement distancing
themselves from it, asserting that the study did not "adequately justify its
recommendation [to change] the regulatory regime for broker-dealers
and investment advisers."1 4 6 In particular, they claimed the study did not
"appropriately account for the potential overall cost" of recommenda-
tions and was merely a "starting point for further research and considera-
tion."1 47 At the same time, House Republicans have been pushing to des-
ignate FINRA as an SRO for investment advisers as well as brokers, and
task it with the enforcement of a uniform fiduciary standard, a process
that may further muddy the waters. 14 8 Finally, the SEC, which is respon-
142. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 48. As Hazen observes, Congress "punted" by granting the
SEC authority to harmonize the standard and mandating that the Commission conduct a study, as
opposed to writing a standard into Dodd-Frank itself. Id. at 53-54.
143. Interestingly, the SEC study was delivered less than two weeks before Thomas was decid-
ed.
144. SEC STUDY, supra note 5, at vi-vii.
145. The SEC Study explicitly rejected eliminating the IAA's broker-dealer exclusion (thus
subjecting brokers to the full body of IAA requirements), reasoning that such an approach would be
inflexible compared to "tak[ing] the best of each regulatory regime." Id. at 140-41, 143.
146. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Statement by SEC Commissioners: Statement
Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Jan. 21, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch01221lklctap.htm. The SEC is
composed of five commissioners appointed to five-year terms by the President of the United States;
no party may be represented by more than three commissioners. At the time the SEC Study was
released, the Commission had two Democrats, two Republicans, and an Independent..
147. Id. Calling for additional economic analysis of a regulation is a common strategy to stall
its implementation. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff, Jr., Senate Republicans Prod SEC Nominees on Dodd-
Frank, INVESTMENT NEWS (June 19, 2011), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110619/
REG/306199978. See Robert S. Adler, Op-Ed, Safety Regulators Don't Add Costs. They Decide
Who Pays Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/opinion/safety-
regulators-dont-add-costs-they-decide-who-pays-them.html, for a counterpoint to arguments railing
against the economic costs of regulation. Adler also notes that cost-benefit analyses are already part
of virtually all agency studies and recommendations. Id.
148. See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, Draft Bill Calling for SRO for Advisors Introduced in House,
ADVISORONE (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.advisorone.com/2011/09/08/draft-bill-calling-for-sro-for-
advisors-introduced. See generally Spencer Bachus, Discussion Draft, THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS.,
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sible for many regulatory activities, is perennially resource-constrained
and must prioritize among a number of competing duties; there is no
guarantee that a unified fiduciary standard for brokers and advisers will
be a top priority in the near future.149 Given the variety of options on the
table, likely opposition from Republicans, and the internal constraints of
the SEC, it is difficult to predict the direction and timeline for the pro-
posed reforms.5 0
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision to dismiss the claim in Thomas estab-
lished a clear and predictable legal rule exempting brokers from regula-
tion under the IAA when they provide advice connected to the sale of a
security. In doing so, the court favored predictability over the protection
of investors, choosing to shield brokers when they provide customers
with advice that is not in the latter's best interest. Although the court
seemed at pains to provide an uncontroversial analysis based on tradi-
tional canons of statutory interpretation, its unnecessary reliance on a
confused parsing of the language of the IAA's broker-dealer exemption
undermined the clarity of that analysis.
With the SEC poised to make new rules unifying the regulation of
brokers and advisers, the effects of Thomas may be relatively short-lived.
However, it is unclear when these new rules will be proposed and enact-
ed, and what shape they will take. In the meantime, an interpretation of
the broker exemption that implements the proposed "substantial factor"
test may provide less predictability, but will capture the full meaning of
"solely incidental to." In doing so, it will afford courts more opportunity
to address each case on its own merits, ensuring that investors do not fall
victim to self-serving recommendations from those they trust with their
very financial futures.
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http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BACHUS 017 xml.pdf(last visited Oct. 21, 2011)
(a discussion draft of a house bill discussing the amendment of the investment Advisers Act of 1940
to provide for the registration and oversight of national investment adviser association).
149. See generally The Investor's Advocate, supra note 70, for a discussion of the Commis-
sion's numerous responsibilities.
150. Commissioner Casey stepped down in August; her seat remained open until the confirma-
tion of Republican Daniel M. Gallagher on Oct. 21, 2011. Mr. Gallagher has already telegraphed his
concerns for regulatory costs. See Schoeff, supra note 147.
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